This article will cover:
- What are conspiracy theories?
- Why do we believe in conspiracy theories?
- Who is more likely to believe in them?
- What are the consequences of conspiracist ideation?
What are conspiracy theories?
The earth is flat. Moon landing was fake. Climate change is a hoax. These are only a few of the conspiracy theories that gained substantial popularity over the last years…. A conspiracy is an explanation that a social event or situation is a result of a secret plot devised by powerful groups with malicious intent [9]. The problem with these theories is that they are unsubstantiated, and so develop even more when plausible explanations are available [3, 21]. Also, they are resistant to falsification because both the lack of evidence for the actual theory, and the evidence that contradicts the theory, are interpreted as proof supporting its truth [15, 23]. This is because conspiracy theorists believe that those responsible for the conspiracy are trying to cover up the truth by providing evidence against it [15]! Conspiracy theories are therefore a matter of belief rather than something that can be proven [1].
The first major research into conspiracy theories was conducted by Ted Goertzel [11]. He proposed that conspiracies form a monological belief system [11, 21]: people who believe in one conspiracy theory are also more likely to believe in other, unrelated ones [21]. Oddly enough, researchers found that this also applies to theories that are mutually exclusive! For example, in a study by Wood and colleagues [23], participants who believed that Princess Diana was murdered were more likely to also believe that she staged her own death... So it seems that the content of the conspiracy theory itself is not as important as the idea that authorities were involved in a cover-up [23].
Why do we believe in conspiracy theories?
As conspiracy theories became more popular, psychologists and sociologists began to explore the underlying mechanisms that could explain why people believe in them.
Psychologist Clarke [6] suggested that the fundamental attribution error (FAE) plays a key role. FAE refers to the tendency to overestimate the dispositional causes of an event and underestimate the situational ones [6]. In the context of conspiracy theories, this means that we are more likely to assume that a particular social event is a result of someone’s deliberate actions, while disregarding possible situational factors. As an example, take Elvis’ death and subsequent funeral: a situational explanation would be that the funeral occurred because he died due to a heart condition. Instead, a dispositional explanation would be that the funeral occurred because he faked his own death – it was a result of his deliberate action, which reflects the intention to deceive the public [6].
Moreover, the illusory pattern perception (IPP) was proposed as another complementary explanation [22]. People have a natural tendency to automatically look for patterns and relationships between stimuli, in order to make sense of the world. However, this becomes problematic when a person starts seeing patterns that do not exist, leading to IPP [22]. Essentially, conspiracy theorists don’t believe in coincidences… they see patterns everywhere, which leads them to conclude that the event must be the result of a secret plot orchestrated by a group of people [22].
Last but not least, people are more likely to believe a conspiracy theory if it satisfies important psychological motives [9]. These motives can be social, epistemic or existential.
- Social motives reflect the desire for a positive self- or group-image. Conspiracy theorists view the out-group (the one responsible for the event) as malicious, while they regard the in-group (the one they belong to) as the victims of deceit [9].
- Epistemic motives refer to the need to understand one’s environment, in particular the causal explanations for various events. Without an immediate satisfying explanation, one may turn to conspiracies.
- Existential motives reflect the need for safety and control over one’s environment. Research shows that people are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories when they feel anxious, powerless or lack psychological empowerment [9]. In addition, scientists hypothesise that people turn to conspiracy theories when these needs are threatened.
However, more investigation is needed to definitively conclude that conspiracy theories indeed help fulfil these motives.
Who is more likely to believe in conspiracy theories?
The search for specific characteristics that make someone more likely to believe in conspiracy theories is still in its early stages. Still, there are already some preliminary findings regarding the risk factors that might make a person more susceptible.
Personality traits
- Narcissism [5]
- Openness to experience [17]
- Agreeableness [17, 19]
Psychopathology
- Paranoia [7]
- Schizotypy – a continuum of personality characteristics, from normal dissociation to psychosis [7]
- Machiavellianism [16]
- Primary psychopathy [16]
- Anxiety [13]
Social factors
- Political cynicism [19]
- Defiance of authority [17]
- Anomie – a perception that complexity of modern societies has become unintelligent [4]
- Being a member of a minority group [22]
- Being religious [12]
- Extreme political views, especially right-wing [10]
What are the consequences of conspiracist ideation?
Sometimes, conspiracy theories are only harmless fun and they can even be beneficial. A positive consequence is the possibility to uncover real conspiracies [18], such as the Watergate scandal. They could also encourage governments to be more transparent [18]. If taken too far, however, they might have serious impacts not only on the individual, but society as a whole as well.
In what way?
Conspiracy theories may be associated with negative attitudes and prejudice towards certain groups [19]. They might result in violence and extremist behaviours [6]. Furthermore, belief in conspiracy theories that deny climate change can have detrimental effects on the environment. Indeed, people who believe that climate change is a hoax are less likely to engage in climate-friendly behaviours [8, 14]. Lastly, conspiracy theories might also affect people’s health-related choices: believers of theories related to medicine are more likely to mistrust science and medical professionals [6]. Also the anti-vax movement has gained substantial support over the past few years [8], and those who believe in theories such as ‘vaccines cause autism’ are less likely to vaccinate their children, also visible by the decline in vaccinations in recent years [8]. This has also been linked to outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases. All in all, conspiracy theories do have an impact on a more societal level.
So, what about you? Do you believe in any conspiracy theories? Let us know! Or feel free to share the craziest conspiracy theories you have heard!
Extra resources:
1. Podcast episode – explains conspiracy theories: https://open.spotify.com/episode/0H8RJWzyoqsJX046UR4cGr?si=gyb2B28tT_2GxwlcgdXd7Q
2. Podcast – diving into some of the most popular conspiracy theories: https://open.spotify.com/show/5RdShpOtxKO3ZWohR2M6Sv?si=_15ka75UQfapIFKbpj65jg
3. Ted Talk – Conspiracy theories and the quest for truth: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LZoXb1WDpls
4. Video – Talking with conspiracy theorists (really funny, worth watching!): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9NiYeQ-LFl8
References
1. Barkun, M. (2013). A culture of conspiracy: Apocalyptic visions in contemporary America (Vol. 15). Univ of California Press.
2. Barron, D., Morgan, K., Towell, T., Altemeyer, B., & Swami, V. (2014). Associations between schizotypy and belief in conspiracist ideation. Personality and Individual Differences, 70, 156-159. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.06.040
3. Brotherton, R., French, C. C., & Pickering, A. D. (2013). Measuring belief in conspiracy theories: The generic conspiracist beliefs scale. Frontiers in psychology, 4, 279. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279
4. Bruder, M., Haffke, P., Neave, N., Nouripanah, N., & Imhoff, R. (2013). Measuring individual differences in generic beliefs in conspiracy theories across cultures: Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire. Frontiers in psychology, 4, 225. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00225
5. Cichocka, A., Marchlewska, M., & De Zavala, A. G. (2016). Does self-love or self-hate predict conspiracy beliefs? Narcissism, self-esteem, and the endorsement of conspiracy theories. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 7(2), 157-166. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1948550615616170
6. Clarke, S. (2002). Conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorizing. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 32(2), 131-150. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F004931032002001
7. Darwin, H., Neave, N., & Holmes, J. (2011). Belief in conspiracy theories. The role of paranormal belief, paranoid ideation and schizotypy. Personality and Individual Differences, 50(8), 1289-1293. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.02.027
8. Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2018). Why conspiracy theories matter: A social psychological analysis. European Review of Social Psychology, 29(1), 256-298. https://doi-org.eur.idm.oclc.org/10.1080/10463283.2018.1537428
9. Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Cichocka, A. (2017). The psychology of conspiracy theories. Current directions in psychological science, 26(6), 538-542. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0963721417718261
10. Douglas, K. M., Uscinski, J. E., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C. S., & Deravi, F. (2019). Understanding conspiracy theories. Political Psychology, 40, 3-35. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12568
11. Goertzel, T. (1994). Belief in conspiracy theories. Political psychology, 731-742. https://doi.org/10.2307/3791630
12. Goreis, A., & Voracek, M. (2019). A systematic review and meta-analysis of psychological research on conspiracy beliefs: Field characteristics, measurement instruments, and associations with personality traits. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 205. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00205
13. Grzesiak-Feldman, M. (2013). The effect of high-anxiety situations on conspiracy thinking. Current Psychology, 32(1), 100-118.
14. Jolley, D., & Douglas, K. M. (2014b). The effects of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories on vaccination intentions. PLoS ONE, 9(2), e89177. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0089177
15. Keeley, B. L. (1999). Of conspiracy theories. The Journal of Philosophy, 96(3), 109-126. https://doi.org/10.2307/2564659
16. March, E., & Springer, J. (2019). Belief in conspiracy theories: The predictive role of schizotypy, Machiavellianism, and primary psychopathy. PloS one, 14(12), e0225964. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0225964
17. Swami, V., Chamorro‐Premuzic, T., & Furnham, A. (2010). Unanswered questions: A preliminary investigation of personality and individual difference predictors of 9/11 conspiracist beliefs. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24(6), 749-761. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1583
18. Swami, V., & Coles, R. (2010). The truth is out there: Belief in conspiracy theories. The Psychologist, 23(7), 560–563. Retrieved from http://www.thepsychologist.org.uk/archive/archive_home.cfm?volumeID=23&editionID=190&ArticleID=1694
19. Swami, V., & Furnham, A. (2012). Examining conspiracist beliefs about the disappearance of Amelia Earhart. The Journal of General Psychology, 139(4), 244-259. https://doi.org/10.1080/00221309.2012.697932
20. Swami, V., Voracek, M., Stieger, S., Tran, U. S., & Furnham, A. (2014). Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories. Cognition, 133(3), 572-585. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.006
21. Thresher-Andrews, C. (2013). An introduction into the world of conspiracy. The British Psychological Society. Special issue: The psychology of conspiracy theories, (88), 5.
22. Van Prooijen, J. W., Douglas, K. M., & De Inocencio, C. (2018). Connecting the dots: Illusory pattern perception predicts belief in conspiracies and the supernatural. European journal of social psychology, 48(3), 320-335. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2331
23. Wood, M. J., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2012). Dead and alive: Beliefs in contradictory conspiracy theories. Social psychological and personality science, 3(6), 767-773. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550611434786